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IN THE 
SUPREME COURT 
OF THE 
STATE OF UTAH 
RAYMOND C. HANSEN, 
Plaintiff-Respondent, 
vs. 
MARY J. HANSEN, 
Defendant-Appellant. 
BRIEF OF APPELLANT 
STATEMENT OF THE NATURE OF THE CASE 
The defendant-appellant, Mary J. Hansen, appeals 
from the Decree of Divorce entered against her in the 
Fourth Judicial District Court, Utah County, State of 
Utah, the Honorable George E. Ballif, Judge, presiding. 
DISPOSITION IN THE LOWER COURT 
The lower court found grounds for divorce pursuant 
Case No. 
13985 
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2 
to Section 30-3-1, U. C. A. (1953), as amended, and en-
tered a Decree of Divorce against the defendant-appel-
lant. 
RELIEF SOUGHT ON APPEAL 
Defendant-appellant seeks a reversal of the Decree 
of Divorce, or in the alternative, an increase in the amount 
of alimony payment awarded to defendant-appellant. 
STATEMENT OF THE FACTS 
The plaintiff and defendant are husband and wife, 
having been married at Nephi, Utah on July 21, 1939 
(TR. 3). There are no minor children as issue of this 
marriage (TR. 3). Plaintiff is a retired Naval officer 
(TR. 45). 
On or about August 24, 1972, defendant was awarded 
a Decree of Separate Maintenance against plaintiff (TR. 
5). Defendant was awarded the payments from the Cali-
fornia home and $30 a month alimony (TR. 5). 
The parties have not lived together for many months 
prior to the Decree of Separate Maintenance nor have 
they lived together since that date (TR. 5). 
Plaintiff alleged in his complaint that defendant had 
treated him cruelly (TR. 3). The incidents upon which 
he based his allegations were: (1) disagreemeot as to 
who should pay the income taxes on payments received 
from the sale of their home in California (Trial Trans. 
7); (2) disagreement as to who should pay the property 
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taxes on the California home (Trial Trans. 12); (3) dis-
cussions as to the re-payment to plaintiff for an automo-
bile plaintiff purchased for his son (Trial Transcript 13); 
(4) disagreements as to who should be able to authorize 
the sale of the California home (Trial Trans. 18); (5) 
alienating affections of children and grandchildren (Trial 
Trans. 21); (6) repairing of air conditioning in defen-
dant's trailer home (Trial Trans. 21); and (7) repairing 
water pipes in defendant's trailer home (Trial Trans. 
22). 
Testimony of a psychiatrist was offered by plaintiff 
to show that the above incidents caused him great mental 
distress. However, defendant's supposed acts were not 
shown to be the cause of such distress (TR. 44, Trial 
Trans. 38-39). 
On July 20, 1974, the lower court granted plaintiff 
a Decree of Divorce (TR. 50-52). Defendant was awarded 
the $130 monthly payment from the sale of their Cali-
fornia home and $30 monthly alimony. Defendant was 
ordered to post a $1000 cash bond to insure payments 
of a Blue Cross-Blue Shield health insurance premium 
(TR. 50-52). 
Defendant filed a Motion to Amend and Supplement 
the Findings of Fact and Conclusions of Law due to the 
fact that defendant's monthly bills for medicine were 
nearly $100. Under the Navy Champus Program, defen-
dant was entitled to free medication and hospitalization 
(TR. 63). Defendant further contended that the Blue 
Cross-Blue Shield program ordered by the Court as a 
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substitute for the Champus program was much inferior 
(TR. 63). 
Dr. Renzetti, Head, Pulmonary Disease Division, 
College of Medicine, University of Utah Medical Center, 
verified that defendant suffered from bronchiectasis and 
bronchial asthma and that her condition was worsening 
(TR. 73-74). Stone Drug verified that cost of defendant's 
medication alone would be approximately $70 per month 
(TR. 74). 
An Amended Decree of Divorce was entered and de-
fendant granted $70 per month for alimony, along with 
the provisions of the original Decree of Divorce (TR. 
75-77). 
A timely Notice of Appeal was filed by defendant 
(TR. 84). 
> ARGUMENT 
POINT I. 
THE DISTRICT COURT ERRED IN ITS 
FINDING OF FACTS TO SUPPORT A DE-
CREE OF DIVORCE. 
Plaintiff sought and was granted a divorce decree 
pursuant to Section 30-3-1(7) U. C. A. (1953), as 
amended, which sets out as one of the grounds for di-
vorce: "Cruel treatment of the plaintiff by the defendant 
to the extent of causing bodily injury or great mental dis-
tress to the plaintiff." (Emphasis added.) The Court 
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Machine-generated OCR, may contain errors.
5 
based its finding of cruel treatment on several incidents 
which occurred since the Temporary Decree of Separate 
Maintenance in August of 1972. The incidents consisted 
of misunderstandingB and disagreements as to (1) who 
should pay the income taxes on the $130 received from 
the sale of plaintiff's and defendant's California home; 
(2) who should pay the property taxes on said home; 
(3) who could authorize the sale of the California home; 
(4) should the son repay the plaintiff, his father, for the 
car plaintiff bought him; (5) should plaintiff fix the air 
conditioning and water pipes in defendant's trailer house; 
and (6) general accusations that defendant was turning 
the children and grandchildren against plaintiff. 
The above mentioned incidents are not such as would 
cause plaintiff great mental distress. In fact, no proof 
was made that any great mental distress was, in fact, 
caused by said incidents. In fact, the incidents do not 
represent anything more than the natural and usual dis-
agreements and misunderstandings that accompany any 
normal marriage. 
This Court has long held that the incidents of cruelty 
must be aggravated when asserted by the husband as 
grounds for divorce. In Hyrup v. Hyrup, 66 Utah 580, 245 
Pac. 335 (1926), this Court stated: 
"We think the evidence of the wife's conduct in 
this case fails to establish legal cruelty within 
the definition of the statute and the policy of the 
law. In Doe v. Doe, 48 Utah 200, 158 Pac. 781, 
this Court, in dealing with the subject of the 
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wife's cruelty to the husband causing him great 
mental distress, said: 
The adjudged cases show that courts, on 
the ground of cruelty, grant the wife a decree 
on much less evidence than they do the husband. 
. . . Before a decree is granted the husband on 
such ground, it ought to be a somewhat aggra-
vated case." (Emphasis added.) Id. at 337. 
Each particular case must be viewed separately consid-
ering the alleged incidents of cruelty and the character 
of the individual claiming such cruelty. Scheibe, 57 
C. A. 2d 336, 134 P. 2d 835 (1943). In our case it is the 
husband who is claiming great mental distress. However, 
great mental distress cannot be based on a few enumer-
ated disagreements between the plaintiff-husband and de-
fendant-wife. Crenshaw v. Crenshaw, 120 Mont. 190, 182 
P. 2d 477 (1947). The incidents, as complained of by 
plaintiff, do not represent cruel treatment such as would 
cause great mental distress. A husband's feelings are less 
easily hurt because of his character, refinement, intelli-
gence, and delicacy of sentiment. Scheibe, supra. Plain-
tiff is a retired Naval Officer. Certainly these minor 
incidents would not cause great mental distress to a per-
son of plaintiff's background. He is surely accustomed to 
disagreements, having been a Naval officer. And as 
pointed out by the Utah Court in Hyrup supra, there 
being no aggravated case proven, the defendant-wife's 
conduct in this case fails to establish cruel treatment 
causing great mental distress. 
Not only are the incidents raised by plaintiff insuf-
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ficient to warrant a divorce for cruel treatment, but they 
were never proven to have caused mental distress to the 
plaintiff. Causation is essential. Farrand v. Farrand, 77 
C. A. 2d 840, 176 P. 2d 773 (1947). Plaintiff has failed 
to carry his burden of proof in this case. The testimony 
offered by plaintiff's psychiatrist only established that 
plaintiff suffered from mental anguish. No causation be-
tween the incidents and plaintiff's mental distress was 
established. 
"It is not enough that they both desire a divorce 
or refuse to live with each other. Courts are not 
authorized to grant divorces except for the par-
ticular causes prescribed by law, and then only 
when the grounds or cause for divorce is proved 
by substantial and satisfactory evidence" (Em-
phasis added.) (Hyrup at 338.) 
This Court has reiterated that a divorce may be granted 
only for the particular causes enumerated in Section 
30-3-1 U. C. A. (1953), as amended, and then only if the 
cause is proved. Such is not the case here. The incidents, 
as enumerated by plaintiff, were never shown to be the 
cause of plaintiff's mental anguish. In fact, the only testi-
mony presented was plaintiff's own testimony that he 
suffered great mental distress. Surely this cannot be 
considered "substantial and satisfactory evidence," as re-
quired in Hyrup, supra. 
The lower court may have considered the grounds 
for divorce met since the plaintiff and defendant had 
been living apart, coupled with the disagreements they 
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have had. However, this Court has been very strict in 
requiring that the statutory requirements for divorce be 
met. In Holman v. Holman, 94 Utah 300, 77 P. 2d 329 
(1938), this court stated: 
". . . But the Legislature has laid down grounds 
on which divorce may be granted. They must 
be present. The mere drifting apart because of 
failure to synchronize interests or ambitions is 
no ground for a divorce although it may be that 
the parties cannot and should not be compelled 
to live together . . ." (Emphasis added.) Id. at 
330. 
The grounds for divorce under Section 30-3-1 (7) U. C. A. 
(1953), as amended, are not present. No cruel treatment 
that would cause great mental distress has been shown. 
Although they are living apart under an Order of Separate 
Maintenance, and they have had minor disagreements, 
the statutory requirements for divorce have not been met. 
As stated in Greener v. Greener, 116 Utah 571, 212 P. 2d 
194 (1949): 
". . . The fact that the parties do not care to 
live together is not, per se, a reason for the 
granting of a divorce, though it might be a reason 
for their living apart and may be a sufficient 
basis for an action for separate maintenance 
. . ." Id. at 198. 
The fact that plaintiff and defendant do not care to live 
together, though perhaps grounds for separate mainten-
ance, are not grounds for divorce. The incidents enum-
erated by plaintiff do not constitute "cruel treatment" 
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that would cause "great mental distress." Plaintiff, as 
husband, must prove a more aggravated case than would 
a wife. He has failed to do so. Therefore, the divorce 
decree should be reversed. 
POINT II. 
THE DISTRICT COURT ABUSED ITS DIS-
CRETION IN THE AMOUNT OF ALIMONY 
AWARDED. 
Defendant argues in the alternative, that if this Court 
upholds the Decree of Divorce entered by the lower court, 
then this Court should increase the monthly alimony 
award from the present $70 to $100. Pursuant to Friedli 
v. Friedli, 65 Utah 605, 238 Pac. 647 (1925), and Blair 
v. Blair, 40 Utah 306, 121 Pac. 19 (1912), this Court has 
the right to correct the alimony award payment which 
is grossly inadequate and unjust. 
Defendant is suffering from bronchiectasis and bron-
chial asthma. Her monthly medical expense just for 
drugs was set at $70 in November, 1974. The cost of such 
drugs has and will rise even more. Defendant is also re-
quired to make periodic visits to the hospital for exam-
ination. In the deposition taken from Dr. Attillis D. 
Renzetti on June 20, 1972, at page 9, he testified that 
defendant might require one week to ten days hospital-
ization every two years. This could cost well over $1000. 
While married to plaintiff, defendant is entitled to 
free medical treatment and drugs from a military installa-
Digitized by the Howard W. Hunter Law Library, J. Reuben Clark Law School, BYU. 
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tion under the CHAMPUS PROGRAM. The lower court 
in its Decree of Divorce required plaintiff to obtain medi-
cal coverage under a Blue Cross-Blue Shield Plan. It also 
required plaintiff to post a $1000 cash bond to secure 
payment of the premiums on the policy. However, de-
fendant argues on appeal that the Blue Cross-Blue Shield 
Plan is grossly inadequate as compared to the CHAM-
PUS Program. 
A comparison of the two policies on a per year basis 
follows: 
CHAMPUS BLUE CROSS-
BLUE SHIELD 
In-Patient Hospital Benefits 
1. Unlimited use of military 1. B e n e f i t s are paid on 
hospitals free of charge. enumerated types of care. 
2. Civilian hospitals - un- 2. Listed benefits are paid in 
limited eligibility for hos- full after $100 deductible 
pital use. Champus pays per calendar admission. 
75% of cost, patient pays 
25%. 
Out-Patinet Drugs 
1. Completely free at a 1. Major medical coverage -
military hospital or drug $1,000 deductible per cal-
store. endar year, then 100% 
coverage. 
2. In a civilian drug store, 
$50 deductible per year, 
then 75% coverage. 
Digitized by the Howard W. Hunter Law Library, J. Reuben Clark Law School, BYU. 
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Out-Patient Care (office calls) 
1. Completely free f r om 1. Major medical coverage -
military doctors and hos- $1,000 deductible per cal-
pital. endar year, then 100% 
coverage. 
2. Under civilian care, $50 
deductible per year, then 
75% coverage. 
Psychiatric or Mental Care (Nervous Disorders) 
1. Completely free f r o m 1. Major medical coverage -
military hospital or doc- $1,000 deductible per cal-
tor. endar year, then 50% of 
reasonable costs up to 
$1,500 per calendar year. 
2. Under civilian d o c t o r , 
75% coverage. 
Physical, Speech or Occupational Therapy 
1. Completely free f r o m 1. Maximum of $200 per 
military therapists. year. 
2. Under civilian therapists, 
75% of unlimited cover-
age. 
Dental 
1. 75% coverage of dental 1. No dental care. 
care with authorization. 
Cost 
1. No cost. 1. Up to 
age 55 - $309.60 per year 
55 - 59 - $336.00 per year 
60 - 64 - $362.40 per year 
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The above comparison demonstrates the inadequacy 
of the Blue Cross-Blue Shield program. Examining the 
defendant's costs under e^ tch program for her "typical 
year" would yield the following results: 
Basis: $1,000 for drugs 
$1,000 for hospitalization care 
CHAMPUS BLUE CROSS-
BLUE SHIELD 
Result: Defendant would Result: Defendant w o u l d 
have no charge at a mili- pay first $1,000. Remainder 
tary installation. At a ci- would be covered, 
vilian hospital and drug 
store she would pay $250 
for hospital care and $286 
for drugs ($50 deductible 
plus 25% of remainder), 
totaling $536. 
Thus it may be seen that defendant would be re-
quired to pay nearly twice as much per year under the 
Blue Cross-Blue Shield plan. This is excluding the costs 
for premiums. 
Therefore, if this Court; does uphold the lower court's 
Decree of Divorce, defendant argues in the alternative 
that the amount of alimony awarded in said decree ($70) 
is inadequate, and the trial court abused its discretion. 
The Blue Cross-Blue Shield policy would cost defendant 
$1,000 per year, plus the cost of premiums if plaintiff does 
not pay for them for the rest of defendant's life. The 
award should be increased to $100 per month, to meet 
that extra cost of said policy. 
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CONCLUSION 
Based on the above arguments, the lower court erred 
in granting plaintiff a Decree of Divorce. In the alterna-
tive, if the Decree of Divorce is upheld, defendant con-
tends that the lower court abused its discretion in the 
amount of alimony awarded, and said amount should be 
increased to $100 per month. 
Respectfully submitted, 
RICHARD M. TAYLOR 
Attorney for 
Defendant-Appellant 
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